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I. Introduction: Why Do We Protect Minority Rights? 
 
The answer to this question seems obvious. As human rights, they protect 
the individuals’ distinct ethnical, language, religious or other identity, and 
in this way, minority rights help preserve the existence of communities 
sharing the same distinct features. At least this is the official canon of the 
international protection of minority rights. Whether openly or tacitly, 
politicians and political scientists often have a different view. Both see 
domestic and international minority rights protection as important because 
ethnic conflicts have tremendous potential for destruction, as has been 
seen over the past fifteen years, especially on the territories of the former 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Consequently, there are two goals, and 
they do not contradict: stability and security presuppose the protection of 
identity. Still, the two goals are not on the same level; for while the 
protection of identity is itself a goal, it also serves as a tool of the primary 
target, international stability and security. This is the case now, and it was 
the understanding after World War I. As US President Woodrow Wilson 
expressed in May 1919 at the peace conference after World War I, 
‘Nothing […] is more likely to disturb peace of the world than the 
treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to 
minorities’.1 After World War II, international discussion of the protection 
of minority rights was dropped for decades, for it was regarded as 
irreconcilable with international security. The reference point was Adolf 
Hitler, who manipulated ideas on the rights of German minorities across 
Europe. So at the San Francisco Conference leading up to the UN Charter, 
which would establish the basic international human rights norms, it was 
                                                          
1  As quoted by: Jan Helgesen, ‘Protecting Minorities in the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Process’ in Allan Rosas and Jan Helgesen (eds.), The 
Strength of Diversity: Human Rights and Pluralist Democracy (Dordrecht, 1992), p. 159. 
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bluntly stated: ‘What the world needs now is not the protection of 
minorities, but protection from minorities’.2 
Consequently now there are two competing and completely 
contradictory approaches in international law to the protection of minority 
rights. Still, whether one does or does not protect them, one should act for 
the sake of security. 
Why is it important to deal with the role of kin-states in protecting 
the rights of its kin minorities? It is not simply because of the bad memory 
of Hitler and Nazi Germany, but because many authors see this question 
from a security perspective, asking what are the dangers of such a role and 
what might be its fateful consequences for the stability of interstate 
relations.3 I do not question whether this approach is justified, but I would 
like to underline, if we really think the protection of the rights of 
minorities is of value, we cannot avoid the question: how far can it be 
subordinated to security concerns? A precarious balance is needed if we 
are to take the protection of minority rights seriously and not satisfy 
ourselves with pictures of minority persons as ones who wear national 
costumes, sing folksongs and dance folkdances. 
 
 
 II. Who Should Protect Minority Rights? 
 
The answer to this question might be the following: the minority persons 
and communities themselves, the state in which they live, the international 
machinery designed for this purpose, and the kin-states. 
The first answer may be surprising, but it is easy to understand the 
importance of the rights holders and why the community of rights holders 
should stand up their rights. In its original cast, even cultural autonomy is 
seen as based on classic freedoms, which only require toleration and non-
interference from the state. The minority community takes the opportunity 
offered by freedom of association and education to bring about its own 
private institutions and exercise its rights of self-government. The state 
                                                          
2  As quoted by: Helgesen, op. cit. 
3  See, for example: Konrad Huber and Robert W. Mickey, ‘Defining the Kin-state: An 
Analyses of its Role and Prescriptions for Moderating its Impact’ in Arie Bloed and Piter 
van Dijk (eds.), Protection of Minority Rights through Bilateral Treaties: The Case of 
Central and Eastern Europe (The Hague, 1999), pp. 17–51. 
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may lay down quality requirements (concerning the curriculum, 
acquisition of certificates, etc.) and may seek guarantees that the schools 
educate pupils to become ‘good citizens’, but the schools are founded and 
maintained by the minority community itself. For a long time, this was the 
understanding of cultural autonomy as invoked in international law. A 
change was ushered in by statements as to the positive obligations of the 
state vis-à-vis minorities.4 But even if there are positive state obligations 
arising from minority rights, the actual implementation really needs the 
active behaviour of the rights holders to secure and maintain them. For 
example, in the case of rights to official use of a minority language, they 
should accept being seen as troublemakers who make the work of local 
state offices and courts more complicated and more expensive. 
Minority rights are human rights. Consequently, the state in which 
the minority lives has the primary duty to protect minority rights. 
Protection basically depends on the domestic constitutional system of the 
state. But even if the state is a perfect democracy—and which state is 
that?—it could happen that it is a majoritarian democracy, where ‘winners 
take all’ and pay no significant attention to minority wishes without heed 
as to whether the groups belong to political, ethnic or any other minority. 
To belong to a minority is never an advantage. Moreover, as James 
Madison, one of the founding fathers of the US Constitution, stated: ‘In all 
cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the 
rights of the minority is in danger’.5 This danger occurs when the Jacobin 
concept of nation state satisfies itself with equality before the Constitution, 
not paying attention to such particularities as language or culture. Even if 
minority rights on language and culture are legally settled and the 
majority-minority relationship is relaxed, the state may not provide 
generous subsidies for minority education and cultural institutions. Rich 
minorities who could finance their institutions are rare, especially in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, it is more advantageous for the 
majority to preserve dependence on the central state budget than to give 
minority organisations or churches property or to establish legal 
                                                          
4  See, for example: Article 1 and 5 of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UN General Assembly 
resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992). 
5  As quoted by: Jon Elster, ‘On Majoritarianism and Rights’, East European 
Constitutional Review 1:3 (1992), p. 20. 
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opportunities for them to share local taxes so that they could finance their 
institutions from their own resources. Cultural autonomy, however, if 
implemented at all, is likely to remain formal as long as every penny 
depends on the good will of the majority. 
Today nobody can convincingly deny that the protection of minority 
rights is a part of the protection of international human rights. 6 
Consequently, they share the same achievements and pitfalls. No doubt, 
the international supervisory mechanisms go on their way, although 
Philiph Allott is right in saying: ‘[…] governments have been reassured in 
their arrogance by the idea that, if they are not proved actually violating 
the substance of particularised human rights, if they can bring their 
lawyerly qualifications and exceptions, then they are doing well enough’.7 
Moreover, international supervisory mechanisms neither in the case of 
economic, social and cultural rights nor in the case of minority rights are 
empowered to distribute money to help compliance with them. 
International protection of human and minority rights also reflects the 
achieved level and problems of general inter-state co-operation. 
Even if the minority rights holders actively demand the 
implementation of their rights, the home state does its best to do so, and 
the international supervisory machinery correctly sends signals about 
shortcomings, there is a room for the kin-state to play a role. The question 
is: what kind of role is legitimate and does not undermine security? 
 
 
III. The Role of Kin-states 
 
Four types of actions can be taken by a kin-state in favour of its kin 
minority: actions in the context of international bodies and mechanisms, 
actions in co-operation with the home state, actions vis-à-vis other states, 
and domestic legislation on the relationship with its kin minority. 
                                                          
6  Article 1 of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities states: ‘The protection of national minorities and of rights and 
freedoms of persons belonging to those minorities forms an integral part of the 
international protection of human rights, and such falls within the scope of international 
co-operation’. 
7  Philiph Alott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford, 1990), as quoted in: 
Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston (eds.), International Human Rights in Context (Oxford, 
2000), p. 703.    
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As far as the first option is concerned, international institutions 
clearly represent a legitimate instrument for achieving foreign policy 
goals, especially if the kin-state stays inside established institutional 
processes. The relatively new practice that states do not regard human 
rights (including minority rights) as a part of the exclusive domain reservé 
of state sovereignty could make it relatively easy for kin-states to rely on 
international bodies and mechanisms.8 But it is worth recalling that even 
before this became widely recognised, the inter-state complaint procedure 
under the European Convention on Human Rights was used to protect the 
rights of ‘persons with whom the applicant State had a special relation’9 
(i.e. members of their kin minority). Complaint applications by Cyprus 
against the United Kingdom concerned the mistreatment of Cypriots of 
Greek origin.10 Austria started procedures against Italy to protect the rights 
of six persons from South Tyrol. 11  Ireland’s applications against the 
United Kingdom concerned the rights violation against Roman Catholics 
in Northern Ireland. 12  Although formally Cyprus’ application against 
Turkey was about the mistreatment of Cypriot citizens, actually they had 
Greek origin.13 If you take into consideration that only some inter-state 
procedures have been launched so far and four were to protect the rights 
of kin minorities, you could hardly escape the conclusion that at least in 
Europe there is an established practice to act in favour kin minorities in 
the context of international bodies and procedures. 
Many cases could be cited from the OCSE (CSCE), the European 
Parliament, and Council of Europe in which kin-states came forward with 
initiatives aimed directly or indirectly at their kin minorities. In a broader 
view, even initiatives and efforts to set minority rights norms belong here, 
for it is not by chance which states are active in this field. Norm setting 
activity by itself cannot be questioned, and it contributes to the 
progressive development of international law. Returning to the inter-state 
                                                          
8  See: fn. 6. 
9  The expression is taken from P. van Dijk and G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Deventer, 1990), p. 35. 
10 Appls. 175/56, 299/57. 
11 Appl. 788/66. The role of guarantor, or guardian (Schutzmacht), of the German speakers 
of south Tyrol was delegated to Austria by the 1946 Austrian-Italian Treaty. Consequently, 
Austria was legitimated to start the procedure as the kin-state.  
12 Appls. 5310/71, 5451/72. 
13 Appls. 6780/74, 6950/75. 
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complaint procedure under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
although it provides only a limited possibility to address the rights of kin 
minority persons—specific minority rights are not included into the 
Convention and its Additional Protocols—it could work well in this area 
because of its quasi-judicial, impartial, and authoritative character. In 
general, the use of international bodies by a kin-state is advantageous. If 
other states join with the kin-state, it legitimates its efforts; if not, its 
behaviour is immediately tempered. Furthermore, international bodies do 
not simply reflect the opinion of the member states, but channel their 
conflicts as well. 
As far as common actions of the kin and home states, they could 
range from joint declarations to bilateral agreements dealing with minority 
issues and to concrete steps based on them. If an action comes from the 
mutual will of states, it can hardly be questioned; the will of states is the 
foundation of international law. There can be problems with mutuality for 
both objective and subjective factors, though. The objective factor means 
if there is significant asymmetry in the number of members of each 
others’ kin minority. Either as a consequence or independent of this 
objective factor, the subjective factor is the lack of political will to address 
minority issues. Bilateralism in minority issues—if it works—could work 
well, but it could also have drawbacks. As far as the advantages are 
concerned, it is worth quoting the Venice Commission: 
 
The potentialities of bilateral treaties in respect of reducing tensions 
between kin-states and home states (tensions which can rapidly 
escalate when those in power regard minorities as unreliable and 
minorities fear that the home states will not respect their identity) 
appeared to be significant, to the extent that they can procure straight 
commitments on sensitive issues, while multilateral agreements can 
only provide for an indirect approach to those issues. Furthermore, they 
allow for specific characteristics and needs of each national minority as 
well as of the peculiar historical, political and social context to be taken 
into direct consideration.14 
                                                          
14 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), ‘Preferential 
Treatment of National Minorities by Their Kin-states’. Report, CDL (2001) 97, p. 4. Also 
available at <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL(2001)097-e.asp>, accessed 6 
January 2006. 
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In many cases, the supervision over implementing such agreements is 
vested in joint governmental commissions empowered to bring 
recommendations to the respective governments. These commissions are 
capable of treating sensitive minority issues as normal business. Of the 
possible drawbacks to bilateral approaches to minority issues, 15  I will 
return to the problem of discrimination later; here I consider the truly 
important issue of unequal position of the parties, especially the different 
level of minority participation in the preparation and implementation of 
agreements. 
As a part of its foreign policy, the kin-state could seek the help of a 
third state to achieve the establishment of an important multilateral norm 
or improvements in the position of its kin minority. So much depends on 
the foreign policy capabilities of the kin-state.16 Even more important is 
what the great powers want. In case of the Central and East European 
countries, the Western powers clearly gave a priority to inter-state 
stability, although accepting to a certain extent that only a kind of 
accommodation of minority interests could guarantee lasting internal 
stability. This policy wanted to reconcile these two elements with the help 
of ‘pactomania’; it became a primary goal to convince the states in the 
region to conclude bilateral treaties as a part of broader European 
integration. The ‘Jewel of the Crown’ was the European Stability Pact, the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities came 
second, and the bilateral agreements had to fill the ‘framework’. The 
leading Western states heavily relied on conditionality for membership in 
                                                          
15  See: Gudmundur Alfredsson, ‘Identifying Possible Disadvantages of Bilateral 
Agreements and Advancing the Most Favoured Minority Clause’ in Arie Bloed and Pieter 
van Dijk (eds.), op. cit., pp. 165–175. 
16 In the early nineties the Hungarian Government wanted Recommendation 1201 of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe accepted as an Additional Protocol 
attached to the European Convention on Human Rights (mainly because one of its sections 
contained a vaguely formulated right to autonomy and it provided a right to complaint to 
the European Court of Human Rights). The ‘target state’ of Hungarian foreign policy was 
Germany, on the grounds of German sensitivity towards minority issues and on the 
amicable relationship between Prime Minister Antall and Chancellor Kohl. During the 
October 1993 Conference of the Head of States and Prime Ministers of the Member States 
of Council of Europe, the forum deciding the issue, French President Mitterrand and others 
convinced Kohl to drop the Draft Protocol. The main partner in the European integration 
had stronger arguments.   
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NATO and EU. The message was clear: No Treaty? No Entry!17 The main 
virtue of these agreements is not how they regulate minority rights, but 
their supervision (see above). 
 
 
IV. Domestic Legislation of the Kin-state 
in the Relationship with its Kin Minority 
 
The unilateral actions of the kin-state vis-à-vis the home state of its kin 
minorities can have their origins in constitutional provisions or policy 
statements. Constitutional regulations and policy statements are not on the 
same normative level, although government policy statements mean that 
not only the competence of the government stands behind it, but the 
legislative power of the parliamentarian majority as well. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, constitutional regulations mainly 
came into existence after the Cold War. 18  Governments change their 
policy lines, but the existence of kin minorities abroad is a constant factor, 
bringing continuity at least in this respect. 19  This continuity has been 
reflected in certain policy approaches. For example, in November 1995 
the French Foreign Minister stated in Parliament: ‘(w)e have cared for the 
fate of Quebec for generations, and generations, and I can assure you we 
keep maintaining and developing the very warm ties we enjoy with 
Quebec’.20 
Constitutional regulations and policy statements lead, or could lead, 
to specific domestic legislation providing a wide range of preferential 
treatment to the members of the kin minorities. But neither the 
                                                          
17 Péter Kovács, International Law and Minority Protection: Rights of Minorities or Law 
of Minorities? (Budapest, 2000), p. 108. 
18  The Venice Commission quotes seven constitutions. European Commission for 
Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), op. cit., pp. 3–4. 
19  There are exceptions. The most obvious examples are the former communist 
governments of Central and Eastern Europe. During the Communist era, the socialist 
countries adhered to a tacit agreement not to openly criticise each other’s minority policies, 
not to or hardly help the educational and cultural institutions of their kin minorities, and 
not to bring minority issues to the attention of international bodies, because this would 
helped the ‘international class enemy’.  
20 As quoted in: ‘France Reassures Both Sides’, International Herald Tribune, 1 November 
1995, p. 5.  
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constitutions and the policy statements nor the legislation contain a claim 
of responsibility for ensuring the rights of their kin minority that 
supersedes the competence of the home state and the international 
community. Just the opposite is true; the preferential treatment, or a 
substantial part of it, even might be seen as contributing to the educational 
and cultural infrastructure of the home state, guaranteeing a more 
substantial implementation of the rights of minorities recognised and 
protected by a wide range of international agreements. Language and/or 
culture are of utmost important for the preservation of the identity of those 
minorities.21 
The Venice Commission has written that ‘the preferential treatment 
can be justified in the genuine pursuit of the aim of maintaining cultural 
links with the kin-state’.22 On the basis of this statement, we conclude that 
there is no discrimination if the preferential treatment given to the 
members of its kin minority by the kin-state is confined to the field of 
culture.23  
The other thing that the kin-state legislation must avoid is 
extraterritorial effects. ‘A state can only issue unilateral acts concerning 
foreign citizens inasmuch as the effects of these acts are to take place 
within its national borders. When these acts deploy their effects on foreign 
citizens abroad, in the absence of international customs allowing the state 
to assume the consent of the other states affected, such consent must be 
explicitly sought prior to the adoption of any measure’. 24  The Venice 
Commission does not leave any doubt that such measures cannot be 
enacted unilaterally, even after long, unsuccessful negotiations. In any 
case, there is a contradiction here. Even if the domestic act of the kin-state 
                                                          
21  But there is something more. Language and the culture based on it are somehow 
automatically synonymous with some sort of representation of the minority as well. 
Language is one of the most important expressions of a sense of collective identity, a really 
strong bond in a community which has even been imbued with a mythical significance. 
Even the use of geographic and other place names in the minority language in everyday 
life may be an outward expression of the authentic existence, authentic living of the 
community in the given physical space.  
22 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), op. cit., p. 19. 
23 This interpretation is not shared by everyone. The most powerful opponent is the EU 
Commission, which got Hungary to modify the recipients of certain cultural preferences 
guaranteed by its Status Law from national (ethnic) Hungarians to those who would like to 
learn or to secure education to their children in Hungarian in their home states.    
24 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), op. cit., p. 20. 
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includes measures with extraterritorial effects, its proper implementation 
directly requires the co-operation of the home state anyway. 
If the domestic acts have extraterritorial effects, or a kind of 
discriminative nature, who could complain about it? Obviously both the 
home states, where such effects could take place and whose citizens are 
impacted, and international bodies addressing human and minority rights 
could complain. It is important that not only should the kin-states act in 
good faith, seeking the consent of the home state before legislating 
measures having extraterritorial effects, but the home states should as well 
if it criticises those acts. States cannot undermine expectations created by 
themselves. In this context, if a state does not criticise earlier legislation 
by a kin-state whose kin minority lives on its territory, the state should not 
later criticise domestic acts of another kin-state which has a similar kin 
minority in that home state.25 Or, if a kin-state has very similar domestic 
legislation to another kin-state’s and their kin minorities live on each 
other’s territory, it seems to be dubious for the first state to be critical 
towards the second’s legislation.26 
 
 
Conclusion: The Precarious Balance 
 
Although in the previous decade there were so many words on the 
‘decline of sovereignty’, and according to certain authors we are ‘over the 
nation state’, the efforts of the kin-states in favour of their kin minorities 
need clarification. To do this, international legal and security concerns 
should be reconciled. I am convinced that where international legal 
justification is in place, security concerns are no longer valid because 
international legality itself is a decisive factor of security and stability. 
The precarious balance is set by the following principles to be followed by 
a kin-state: 
 Recognise the primary role to be played by the home state and the 
international community in minority issues; 
                                                          
25 Romania, having both Slovak and Hungarian minorities, never criticised the Slovak 
legislation, only the Hungarian. 
26 Slovakia and Hungary both have their kin minorities on each other’s territory. Slovakia, 
although it earlier enacted very similar legislation, proved to be very critical toward the 
Hungarian act. 
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 Adhere to international human rights mechanisms and procedures of 
international bodies; 
 Favour bilateralism; and 
 In case of unilateral legislation, concentrate on culture and avoid 
extraterritorial effect. 
